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Abstract
In recent years several European municipalities have paired market-based measures with urban distribution centres (UDC) in order to reduce CO2 emissions and make more sustainable urban freight ‡ows.
However, UDCs may add reloading costs and extra delivery times which have relevant impact on both urban
supply chains and the competition among traditional and UDC-based logistics service providers in terms of
service quality and freight rates. By using a duopolistic Hotelling framework, we show that market-based
measures and subsidies might be substitutes to enhance the demand for UDC-based providers but public
funding can be reduced by improving the quality of UDC services. These results can enlarge the scope for
investments in UDC value-adding services in order to decrease private crowding-out e¤ects in the long run.
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Introduction

Urban freight transport plays a crucial role in the sustainable development of many EU cities. In the
last years, transportation and information advances, along with globalization, have dramatically expanded
trades resulting in more dense urban city centres and crowded roads with goods distribution vehicles. Urban
transport generates approximately 23% of overall CO2 emissions of which about a quarter is related to urban
freight (OECD, 2014; Schoemaker et al., 2006). As about 80% of the EU population lives in urbanized areas,
increasing negative e¤ects of goods distribution turn out to be even more problematic into historical cities,
especially in Italy, Spain and France (Erdmenger and Frey, 2010; Dablanc, 2007). Even though the volume
of goods delivery vehicles is estimated to be 10-20% of passenger tra¢ c, most polluting freight vehicles
largely contribute to negative side e¤ects by producing 16 to 50% of the emissions of air pollutants. More,
according to the Air quality in Europe –2016 Report, despite in past …fteen years a persistent decline in the
harmful emissions occurred, the amount of CO2 emissions was in 2014 around 40% higher than the o¢ cial
measurements (EEA, 2016). In economic terms, the adverse impact of road tra¢ c in EU cities resulting in
air pollution and gas emissions has been estimated to generate a damage roughly amounting to about 100
billion e each year, corresponding to about 1% of the EU’s GDP (MDS, 2012; European Commission, 2007).
Beyond environmental issues, heavy and ine¢ cient vehicles used to deliver goods in the urban areas also
make city logistics itself further complex. In comparison to cost, timed-based factors and ‡exibility are central
issues within modern delivery processes (EUROSTAT, 2011). With the future running towards urbanization,
hence in European cities e¢ cient urban freight distribution should coexist in hopefully less congested and
polluted cities. As urban transportation in the EU faces a number of sustainable development challenges, the
European Commission has set the objective of reaching free CO2 city logistics in major urban areas by 2030
(Lebeau et al., 2015). With the major aim to tackle the ine¢ cient utilization of urban freight vehicles (i.e.,
sub-optimal load factor) which contributes signi…cantly to environmental nuisances, structural solutions to
be successfully paired with market-based measured (such as congestion and/or pollution charges) occurred,
making several policymakers intervene in order to manage the ‡ow of goods more e¤ectively (Maggi, 2007).3
In the last twenty years, probably the most interesting and promising structural solution adopted by
municipalities to achieve a more e¢ cient utilization of freight vehicles has been the introduction of urban
distribution centres (UDCs). These are logistics facilities usually situated in the proximity of a city centre
where deliveries from logistics service providers are consolidated and distributed to urban customers (retailers, households) by using eco-friendly vehicles (Crainic et al., 2009; Browne et al., 2005). In principle,
Logistics Service Providers (LSPs) with deliveries scheduled for the urban areas may be able to transfer
their loads at UDCs and thereby avoid entering the congested sites. In turn, UDCs’ operators sort and
consolidate loads from a number of LSPs and delivers them with electric and/or hybrid small vehicles to an
agreed delivery pattern providing an opportunity to optimize consignment times and runs.
3 From

an integrated freights perspective, Zhang et al. (2015) argue that multiple public policies may have a better network

performance as compared with that coming from a single policy type. In other words, incorporating packages of policies could
be the best way to optimize freight transports.
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Despite the concept of consolidated deliveries dates back to the 1970s (when UK and France started socalled transhipment centres), from the 2000s onward, 25 UDC projects in the UK, 14 in Germany, Italy and
the Netherlands, and 11 in France are identi…ed. Several UDC initiates have failed; for instance, in France,
the UK and the Netherlands about only 33% of UDCs proceeded beyond a research project or feasibility
study, while in Germany and Italy roughly 40% of planned UDCs experienced successful trials and were likely
to be fully operational (Allen et al., 2012). Regardless the variable rate of success by country, probably the
most crucial issue regarding the introduction of UDCs is the social acceptance of public subsidies often used
to sustain their activities.
In times of post-crisis public funding cuts, without a clearly acknowledged acceptance of UDCs by a large
number of stakeholders (including taxpayers), there exist obviously concerns about the …nancial viability of
UDCs (Zunder and Ibanez, 2004). The general view is that UDCs must be sustainable by their own in the
medium-to-long run as public subsidies are not necessarily a long-term desirable solution. In fact, long-term
subsidies might undermine the incentive for UDCs’owners to invest in better equipment and thus they may
crowd out quality investments.
As shown in Figure 1, especially in Italy a number of subsidized operational UDCs recently occur (Trentini
et al., 2015). At 2014, more than 15 UDCs have been planned having important contributions from public
authorities regarding both regulation and funding. The main UDCs in Italy are linked to medium-sized
cities (between 100,000 and 500,000 inhabitants) such as Ferrara, Padua, Parma, Siena, and Vicenza, but
in the last years, other small cities (e.g., Frosinone and Aosta) have started to develop similar systems.
Most Italian UDCs bene…t from a large support by public authorities, in the form of direct …nancing for
operational management (Ferrara) or paired restrictive regulations to increase the attractiveness of UDCs
(Modena, Parma, and Vicenza). Also in France, the UDC in La Rochelle seems to keep active thanks to
public subsidies granted since it was established in 2001. Here, subsidies are provided by the local government
for the infrastructure and a …xed amount per package (Ville et al., 2010). In other countries, such as UK or
The Netherlands, public funding was absent or low but the number of successful UDCs smaller than those
in Italy (Köhler and Groke, 2004).

As a possible remedy, many such funding-dependent UDCs have suggested the need for increasing overtime the proportion of cost recovery from customers and to progressively reduce the level of public subsidies
in the long run. In practice, this goal is usually intended to be achieved through signing up new users
(i.e., by enlarging own market shares) to generate greater volumes, and/or providing quality improvements
(value-adding services) to …nal customers. For instance, Aastrup et al. (2012) suggest to include in the
UDC supply some of the following customers-oriented value-adding services: stockholding, pre-tail activities,
order/inventory control, help at delivery, and reverse logistics. Moreover, , e-commerce solutions could be
added as they would enable retailers to provide direct bene…ts to their customers (Dablanc and Rodrigue,
2016). The types of value-added services included in the UDC supply may di¤er according to the di¤erent
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Figure 1: Recent UDC experiences in Italy (1999 - onward).
urban supply chain characteristics.4
Looking at the empirical cases, the experience of the Cityporto in Padua is widely considered one of
the most remarkable Italian successes. After four years of public subsidies (from 2004), it achieved a nonnegative balance at the end of the fourth year (2008), when costs were covered by 75% of the total income
without subsidies, and this target con…rmed from 2009 onward (Morana and Gonzalez-Feliu, 2010). Another
example is the UDC in Monaco where LSPs and customers both pay UDC service costs (Patier, 2006).
More, van Duin et al. (2010) describe in details the UDC experience in Nijmegen (the Netherlands) where
the Binnenstadservice (BSS) received a government subsidy for one year to start-up and then it was able to
make money (and cover costs) only by o¤ering value-adding (extra) services such as return logistics dealing
with package materials, damaged goods or normal mail.
Despite many cases of successful (directly or not) subsidized UDCs have shown social bene…ts ranging
from reduced congestion and air pollution (including CO2) to improved road safety and parking access, more
e¤orts are required to investigate: a) at what extent transaction costs typically associated to UDCs (extra
delivery times due to route diversion and transhipment, UDC service costs) can be o¤set by a combination
of market-based policies (congestion and/or pollution charges) and direct public subsidies and b) how UDC
quality investments (for instance, in the form of value-adding services o¤ered in Padua and Nijmegen UDC
schemes) may in‡uence LSPs’market shares and freight rates. The present work tries to a give a contribution
on these issues, …lling a literature gap. In fact, particularly the impact of UDC on the competition among
4 Danielis

et al. (2013) de…ne an urban supply chain as a part of a supply chain in charge of delivering materials and goods

to an urban area.
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already existing logistics providers has been devoted a rather scarce attention, but it is a crucial key for the
e¤ectiveness of the measure.5
To deal with this issue, we develop a duopolistic Hotelling-based framework to study the e¤ects of the
introduction of public-private UDCs on LSPs spatial competition. In the model the customers (retailers)
are located into city centres and are heterogeneous with respect to delivery times. According to many city
logistics experiences in the EU, we consider that the choice of favourite LSPs by retailers is mainly based
on freight rates and service quality, and that …nal delivery services are performed either by traditional or,
in alternative, by UDC-based LSPs endowed with relatively less polluting (electric, hybrid) vehicles. In this
setting, thus UDCs can be seen as intermediate (downstream) operators which are substitutes for LSPs (by
contract) to perform last mile deliveries. Retailers have di¤erent preferences for horizontal time-related characteristics of services (according to various supply chains) and also might be in‡uenced by features (such as
extra delivery times, market-based measures, public subsidies, and UDC quality investments) when choosing
between traditional and UDC-based logistics providers to be patronized. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the …rst theoretical paper attempting to model the impact of UDCs on the quality-price competition
among LSPs by contributing to the two strands of literature reviewed below.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides an overview on the literature review and
explicate the research questions. Then, section 3 presents the model, describing the two scenarios, pre
and post-UDC, while section 4 discusses the results, investigating the e¤ects of semi-public UDC on LSPs
competition. In particular, we focus our attention on the interplay between public subsidies and UDC quality
investments to determine how the latter could trigger decreasing public subsidies and, at the same time,
enhanced overall consumer welfare (i.e., on average, higher quality at lower freight rates). In the last section
some conclusions and policy implications are drawn.

2

Literature review and research questions

2.1

Literature on urban distribution centres

First, our work contributes to a more conceptual and empirically-based literature related to the analysis
of the potential demand for UDC-based services coming from incumbent LSPs. In general, many authors
have so far restricted their focus on aspects that on-going (or under trial) UDCs share with others successful
experiences (van Duin et al., 2010). The …rst message is that the potential demand for UDC-based services
must be clearly related to the characteristics that, in turn, in‡uence (downstream) requirements shown by
retailers and/or shops-keepers.
Usually, the willingness to apply for UDC-based delivery services is high at the start of an initiative (see
among others, Ambrosini et al., 2004). A problem in practice, however, is that the number of participating
5 By

evaluating twenty-four projects (and focusing on vehicle trips from UDCs to …nal customers), Allen et al. (2012) identify

improvements in load factors ranged from 15% to 100%, reductions in vehicle trips and vehicle kilometres travelled typically
between 60% and 80%, and reductions in greenhouse gas emissions from these transport operations ranged from 25% to 80%.
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LSPs is usually not stable and lower than expected, which implies less economies of scale and thus less
e¤ective bundling possibilities. For example, Regan and Golob (2004) estimate that about 20% of LSPs are
willing to use an UDC. For instance, the trial experience of Utrecht has mainly failed because the number of
LSPs using the UDC was stood low, thus making the centre not …nancially sustainable (Cityports Report,
2005). Overall, this literature has identify the following four main factors that are likely to a¤ect the potential
demand for UDC-based services.
Extra delivery times (from UDCs to …nal customers)
The main problem with the willingness to cooperate in a UDC is that LSPs would not simply give away the
delivery of the goods to another party, because of reliability and time-related issues. In a stated-preference
study about UDCs’potential demand, for instance, Marcucci and Danielis (2008) show that extra delivery
times have a relevant statistical role in explaining the choice between UDCs and alternative traditional
means of delivery. As extra delivery times depend largely on how UDCs are well-integrated in the urban
context, their location outside the urban areas might have a pivotal importance. It should be clear that this
choice largely depends on city characteristics about business activities and population (Crainic et al., 2009).
For example, whereas it is suggested that the UDCs should be located in areas with high density of shops
(Escuìn et al., 2012), it is also widely recognized that UDCs are unlikely to be attractive for many inner city
retailers due to the degree of diversion required from normal routes (Browne et al., 2005). To conclude, the
more acceptable solution is that UDCs should, if available, be close to modal nodes (highways, terminals) in
order to minimize kilometres driven and reduce the route diversion entailing extra delivery times.
Di¤erent types of urban supply chain involved
Since UDCs enter well-established urban supply chains, much urban freights are already consolidated
at intra-company level and it might be very di¢ cult to convince incumbent LSPs to channel their ‡ows of
di¤erent type of products through a single distribution centre.
In particular, following Danielis et al. (2013), retailers who sell perishable products which require dailyand-…xed consignments (such as fresh fruits and vegetables, milk and dairy products, …sh cool, bread and
pastry, newspapers, ‡owers, etc.) are likely to be more time-sensitive – for instance, because they compete
with other similar retailers in terms of product selection – with respect to those selling less perishable
goods requiring weekly-and-‡exible deliveries (e.g., meat, dry food and beverages, frozen food, clothing and
footwear, stationary and tobacco, etc.). Hence, more time-sensitive retailers are likely to demand for superior
delivery services which UDCs should o¤er to related LSPs in terms of well-equipped facilities ensuring reliable
and high-quality deliveries. However, as happened in Malaga and Barcelona (Spain), single UDCs appear
unlikely to be suited for perishable and highly time-sensitive products (Allen et al., 2012).
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Accompanying command and control and market-based measures
Municipalities can indirectly support the UDCs, giving them competitive advantages, by imposing some
restrictive measures to non-UDC vehicles. Typically, command and control measures have been directed
towards restricting goods delivery vehicles (i.e., time-windows, LTZ, etc.), while market-based measures aim
at internalizing the common negative e¤ects of urban deliveries (i.e., through pollution or congestion charges)
(Maggi, 2007).
The …rst type of instruments seem to have further complicate and, in some cases, make more expensive
delivery operations. For instance, vehicle time regulations impose speci…c time-windows within which the
goods vehicles can enter (a part of) the urban areas, and the times at which loading and unloading can
take place. Examples include the introduction of loading time restrictions in pedestrianized areas served by
the UDC (Bristol); the requirement that goods vehicles have at least Euro 3 engines and have a satellite
navigation system (Parma); vehicle access restrictions on HGVs (over 3.5 tonnes) between 06:00 and 07:30
in the historic centre (La Rochelle); the total prohibition of goods vehicles over 8.5 tonnes (Monaco); and
access restrictions for all goods vehicles in the historic centre (Vicenza). In many cases, however, peak-load
hours simply shift from daily to overnight times, making freights more costly for urban retailers (Ville et
al., 2010). In other situations, time-windows appeared to have contribute to generate congestion in speci…c
daily-time ranges (Lindholm and Blinge, 2014; Muñuzuri et al., 2005).
Pollution and congestion charges are introduced mainly to price the externalities caused (and commonly
disregarded) by road users in city centres where urban delivery operations and tra¢ c congestion are particularly critical. In general, these. As widely observed, pollution charges imply that largely diesel-powered
vehicles must pay a fee to enter in a certain area. Di¤erently from congestion charges, pollution charges
impose only the payment of fees, without forbidding circulation. Notable examples are in Göteborg, London,
Rome, Milan, Oslo, and Stockholm, where charges are proportional to the pollution class of the vehicle. For
instance, the Ecopass system implemented in Milan (from 2008 to 2012) entailed an integrated road pricing
policy with free daily charges (e0) for low emission vehicles, such as LPG, methane, hybrid and electric
geared commercial vans (Croci and Douvan, 2016; Cerruti, 2013).
In terms of measures paired with UDCs, for instance, in Ferrara and Vicenza, the local authorities have
put together a number of regulations fostering the use of eco-friendly vehicles for distribution of goods,
whereas the experience of the UDC of Paris was bankruptcy since it was not accompanied by supportive
measures such as the tra¢ c limitation of heavy and polluting goods vehicles (Cityports Report, 2005).

2.2

Literature on quality-price spatial competition

The second strand of literature on which our work is based concerns the quality-price competition among
…rms in a standard Hotelling approach. As seen above, many features could combine together to a¤ect the
potential demand for UDC-based services. Since the seminal work of Hotelling (1929), a very rich literature
has studied the e¤ect of customers’heterogeneity on price competition assuming that consumers incur some
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"costs" to purchase goods or services from a speci…c …rm. The typical two-fold interpretation of those
costs includes either geographical or preference aspects (i.e., the distance between the most-preferred variety
and the e¤ective characteristic of goods and/or services purchased). In particular, for a given degree of
horizontal di¤erentiation among competitors, the main conclusion drawn from Hotelling-based static models
is that market prices would incorporate both production and preference-driven costs incurred by customers.
This fact implies that, when the horizontal di¤erentiation is high (or increasing), the price competition is
relaxed as …rms are able to exert their market power on captive customers, i.e., consumers "located" close
to their preferred …rm in the spatial framework (see among others, Anderson and De Palma, 1992).
In our paper, following Hu et al. (2014) and Nagurney et al. (2014), we …rst depart from the traditional
literature by assuming that the product ‘characteristic’which might di¤erentiate LSPs is represented by delivery times. In terms of industry-speci…c variables, time-based competition is relevant to services associated
with information, such as on-line content distribution, on-line commerce, web hosting (Blackburn, 2012; So,
2000). Likewise, Allon and Federgruen (2007) analyze a general market with service facilities competing
on prices and lead time under varying types of competition. In this case, in a setting in which …rms make
their strategic decisions sequentially by selecting service levels and lead times, the authors show that the
competition results in higher service levels, prices, and demand volumes.
Hu et al. (2014) consider how lengthy could be the delivery of products to study the interaction between
on-line and o¤-line distributions in the logistics competition. Whereas o¤-line competition implies transportation costs (customers have to travel to purchase goods), instead on-line competition entails penalty
costs (customers receive goods delivered and thus are sensitive to waiting times). By contrast, Nagurney
et al. (2014) develop a game theory model to analyze a supply chain network competition in time-sensitive
markets in which consumers respond to the average delivery times associated with various products. In both
cases, however, the focus is on the impact of two or more kinds of costs on prices in a Hotelling framework,
hence without considering any other variables a¤ecting customers’demand.
Di¤erently from these contributions, we enrich the spatial competition among LSPs by explicitly modelling time-sensitive customers (urban retailers) that are willing to pay a higher price either for more reliable
(and faster) delivery times or, in alternative, whenever quality improvements (i.e., implied by value-adding
services) may be provided by UDC-based LSPs. In this sense, regarding to the way in which quality is
formally introduced in the Hotelling competition, the product di¤erentiation literature has mainly allowed
for quality as a strategic variable (not correlated to horizontal di¤erentiation) which is able to enhance
customers’willingness to pay for goods and services.
For the purpose of this research, our main reference is Economides (1989) who shows how (relatively
cheap) quality investments may give …rms the incentive to largely di¤erentiate their products in the variety space (i.e., …rms tend to become "insulated" to exert market power). This ‘maximal di¤erentiation’
suggests that higher quality (together with higher prices as well) have a two-fold e¤ect on demand, that
is, (i) local monopolies are more likely to occur and (ii) the full market coverage might be undermined by
increasing market prices. In other words, in a spatial competition …rms might prefer to "cultivate" their
8

captive customers by competing in quality rather than stealing them each others through a more …erce price
competition. By contrast, Ma and Burgess (1993) enrich this result by showing that, however, quality might
be also a¤ect the price competition in an opposite direction. Since lower-quality …rms have the incentive to
reduce prices to maintain own demand, in a competition with strategic complements, average prices might
turn out to decline.
In a more general setting, Degryse and Irmen (2001) study …rms’incentives to provide quality when it
does a¤ect the degree of horizontal di¤erentiation between products. They …nd that private incentives to
provide quality are insu¢ cient relative to the social optimum if a quality improvement reduces horizontal
di¤erentiation. Intuitively, here quality improvements reduce the ability of …rms to exert market power as
quality and preferences are considered as interacting variables. By contrast, in our model these features are
assumed to not interact when retailers choose which provider to patronize.

2.3

Research questions

In the light of the above controversial e¤ect of quality on prices and by assuming time-based (horizontal)
preferences in the urban logistics competition, our …rst aim is thus to answer the following question: before
the introduction of UDCs, what is the e¤ect of market-based measures (e.g., congestion and/or pollution
charges) on the price-quality competition among LSPs? Do they increase freight rates and/or service quality?
As we will describe later on, by this study we show that LSPs tend to pass-on market-based measures to
urban retailers as (common) costs. Furthermore, whenever retailers are more sensitive to delivery times (i.e.,
perishable goods, daily-…xed consignments), higher service quality come along with higher freight rates as
well. In particular, market-based measures might thus stimulate LSPs to provide higher service quality in
order to ensure a fully-covered market (i.e., own-account deliveries are neglected by retailers). But what
about their e¤ect on market shares? In a pre-UDC scenario, our model states that demands are not a¤ected
neither by preferences for types of deliveries nor by market-based measures. In other words, rather similar
incumbents will internalize those features and split market shares proportionally.
In the post-UDC scenario, however, other elements are at play. On the one hand, public subsidies are
typically granted in order to make UDC-based services more attractive from the LSPs’ perspective (via
reducing service costs). On the other hand (and with opposite e¤ects), extra delivery times are likely to
harm their potential demand. Thus, the second main aim of our paper is to identify how market-based
measures and public subsidies could combine to help UDCs limit their time-based negative externalities. In
particular, we would also answer to the following questions. At what extent market-based measures and
subsidies granted to UDCs might be substitutes or complements to increase the potential demand for UDCbased LSPs? And what about average freight rates? In this sense, we …rst will show those policies might be
substitutes to increase UDC-based LSPs’demand. As expected, whenever either charges or public subsidies
are very high, retailers are more likely to patronize UDC-based LSPs. However, according to Marcucci and
Danielis (2008, p. 281), we also theoretically con…rm that "[...] businesses with frequent, di¤erentiated, and
high-volume deliveries appear less likely to use UDC services [...]". From a social point of view, since highly
9

time-sensitive supply chains are the ones that are likely to generate much urban pollution and congestion,
thus extra delivery times and UDC service costs will further weaken the potential demand for UDC-based
services.
In terms of post-UDC freight rates, as market-based measures and public subsidies instead are complements in order to lower average freight rates, thus higher charges would call for larger subsidies accordingly.
What could be here the role of UDC-based quality improvements? Following the above intuitions drawn
from Economides (1989) and Ma and Burgess (1993), our last result will put forward the idea for which
enough high quality investments (in the form of value-adding services) might allow local governments to
reduce subsidies with the result to convey, on average, higher service quality at lower freight rates in the
post-UDC market.

3

The model

In order to include competition issues into the urban logistics market, in our model we extend the standard
Hotelling linear-city framework taking into consideration UDC service costs and extra delivery times as main
negative externalities su¤ered from urban retailers patronizing UDC-based LSPs. To evaluate the e¤ects
of UDCs on the competition among LSPs, two main scenarios will be contrasted. In the …rst (pre-UDC)
scenario, identical LSPs providing delivery services to urban retailers are assumed to be subject to marketbased measures (congestion and/or pollution charges) to enter city centres. In the second (post-UDC)
scenario, we will consider the introduction of a public-private distribution centre located away from the city
centre (implying a certain level of diversion from normal routes) and assumed to operate by using more
eco-friendly commercial vehicles (i.e., free of charges). From the demand side, in our general setting, urban
retailers can choose between two LSPs, A and B, each o¤ering one unit of delivery services.
Following Hotelling (1929)’s tradition, we assume that A is exogenously located at 0 on the X = [0; 1]
axis, whilst B is located at 1, that is, at the opposite end point of the linear city. A mass of retailers
(whose density is normalised to 1) is heterogeneous with respect to LSPs’delivery times, meaning that they
are willing to pay a higher price for lower delivery times. In this sense, urban retailers’ location between
0

x

1 is meant here to describe time-sensitive retailers who naturally prefer to patronize LSPs that are

closer in term of time-distance. As a result, in this stylized duopolistic market, whenever both providers
o¤er similar freight rates and service quality, retailers with a low (high) x would patronize LSP A (B) over
B (A). Assuming that retailers’preferences are uniformly distributed along the city line, this framework also
allows us to capture a key feature of the competition among LSPs, that is, the fact that delivery times might
combine with freight rates in order to increase own market shares.6 Formally, urban retailers enjoy a net
6 As

for the elements that drive the choice of third-party LSPs by retailers/customers, Voss et al. (2006) report that delivery

reliability is critical to carrier selection, whilst delivery speed and freight rates are also considered to be order winners according
to Silveira (2005).
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utility of Vi (x) when patronizing one unit of delivery services from LSP i = (A; B), as follows:
VA (x) = b q

w x

fA

VB (x) = b q

w (1

x)

Patronizing A
fB

Patronizing B

(1)

Not patronizing any LSP at all7

( 1; 0)

Following Economides (1989), we allow for a utility function that is separable in quality (vertical di¤erentitiation) and variety (horizontal di¤erentiation). In addition to freight rates (fA ; fB > 0), thus retailers’
evaluation of a speci…c third-party LSP is assumed to be a¤ected by two elements, that is, their variable
preference for delivery times and LSPs’service quality.8
As far as delivery times are concerned, we consider a parameter w > 0 that measures the cost of waiting
for a unit of time. From the point of view of customers, LSPs are chosen depending on penalty costs
deduced by delivery times. In a broader sense, this interpretation allows us to map di¤erent urban supply
chains, ranging from less time-sensitive retailers requiring weakly-and-‡exible consignments (lower w) to
more time-sensitive retailers requiring daily-and-…xed consignments (higher w).
In terms of service quality, the choice of a particular LSP by urban retailers is also assumed to be enhanced
by the quality of delivery services o¤ered. In this case, we can de…ne the level of service quality as a basic
"bundle" of di¤erent speci…c characteristics that improves customers’utility (i.e., relational attributes, full
regulatory compliance, etc.). In our setting, LSPs rely upon service quality as a key variable to compete with
rivals and, at the same time, to make retailers prefer to patronize third-party providers instead of recurring
to own-account deliveries. In the pre-UDC scenario, in order to focus on the e¤ect of freight rates on demand
(markets shares), from now on we consider a symmetrical (exogenous) service quality q o¤ered by each LSP.
All else equal, this implies that, before an UDC is set up, retailers have the same gross willingness to pay for
delivery services. The marginal utility of service quality is measured by the parameter b > 0. Summing-up,
as described in the above formulation, we formally consider a standard disutility of x (time-distance between
LSP A and the retailers’ location) times the linear ‘costs’ of delivery times w incurred by retailers when
choosing A as service provider and the related disutility of (1

x) times w when choosing B.

From the supply side, in the model we assume that both LSPs’operating costs (e.g., delivery logistics,
vehicles maintenance, handling) can be accounted for each freight separately and set to zero.9 However,
taking into consideration market-based measures established to reduce tra¢ c nuisances and air pollution,
7 In

our formulation, retailers are assumed to not be able to stock up goods as their shops size is constrained. This means

that, for very high freight rates set by LSPs, they would consider outside options such as own-account deliveries. For simplicity,
we model an utility function for which customers that gain strictly less than zero utility decide to not patronize any LSP at all.
In other words, as retailers compete in downstream markets, it is assumed that the competitive quality-based loss they incur
being served by LSPs is relatively bigger than the cost of own-account deliveries.
8 From a transportation perspective, here we apply a generalized cost approach as all the operators along an urban supply
chain would contribute to the ‘price’of freight delivery. As we will se later on, this view is particularly important when dealing
with the post-UDC scenario in which a reloading (downstream) node is added.
9 Without signi…cant loss of generality, we rule out other transport costs (fuel) and/or …xed costs related to facilities’overheads
that are not likely to pass-through to customers in the short run.
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in the pre-UDC setting we assume that A and B are traditional LSPs which perform consignments in inner
urban areas using own (at some extent) polluting commercial vehicles. As a consequence, these vehicles
entail marginal charges c > 0 set by municipalities.10

3.1

Symmetrical pre-UDC scenario: equilibrium analysis

Before deriving the pre-UDC equilibrium, it is useful to de…ne how LSPs’demand functions are in‡uenced
by freight rates and service quality. According to the utility functions described in (1) and given that the
share of retailers patronizing A can be identi…ed by its location 0
VA (x)

VB (x) () b q

)

x

w x

x(fA ; fB ) =

fA

x

b q

1 fB fA
+
2
2w

1, we derive A’s demand as:
w (1

x)

fB

DA (fA ; fB )

(2)

This means that all the retailers indexed by [0; x(fA ; fB )] will choose LSP A as logistics service provider.
As a result, LSP B’s (residual) demand is easily derived as:

DB (fB ; fA )

1

DA (fA ; fB ) =

1 fA fB
+
2
2w

(3)

and all the customers indexed by [x(fA ; fB ); 1] will patronize LSP B. Retailers located close enough to
zero (in terms of time-distance) in the X space are bounded by a threshold value of x above which they prefer
to patronize A. In equilibrium, whenever LSPs o¤er similar levels of service quality and freight rates, the
outcome in terms of market share implies the standard Hotelling result for which the market is split into two
equal parts, that is, each LSP would gain half the market (as in Figure 3 below). For a given symmetrical
service quality o¤ered, thus LSPs must compete in freight rates in order to steal customers from rivals.
To formally derive the equilibrium freight rates, we consider LSPs maximizing the following pro…t functions with respect to own freight rates:11

A (fA ; fB )

=

Z

DA (fA ;fB )

(fA

c) dx

0

B (fB ; fA )

=

Z

(4)
1

(fB

c) dx

DA (fA ;fB )

1 0 From

a normative point of view, the parameter c can be also interpreted as a proxy for the share of polluting commercial

vehicles existing in an urban area. For instance, higher levels of c would mean that, on average, traditional LSPs make use of
diesel-powered vehicles Euro 0, 1, 2, with PM10 emission factors from 50 to more than 100 mg/km.
1 1 By assuming delivery costs equal to zero, we focus our attention on the cost-e¤ect of pollution charges and we also rule
out (without loss of generality) analytical issues related to the fact that in LSPs’ pro…t functions the standard Hotelling-style
transportation costs (horizontal di¤erentiation) are substituted by (time-based) penalty costs for the retailers. In this case,
pro…t functions would have accounted for the physical distance from LSPs’ location to each retailer served. See also Hu et al.
(2014) for details.

12

By inserting (2)-(3) in (4) and applying the relative …rst order conditions, i.e., @
@

B (fB ; fA )=@fB

A (fA ; fB )=@fA

= 0 and

= 0, we derive LSPs’best response functions as follows:12

fA (fB )

w + c + fB
2

=

(5)
fB (fA )

w + c + fA
2

=

Equations in (5) clarify that freight rates are strategic complements between LSPs (i.e., @fA (fB )=@fB =
@fB (fA )=@fA =

1
2

> 0), as the standard 50 cents-on-the-dollar property applies. All else equal, indeed an

unilateral (marginal) freight rate increase leads to lower overall demand (i.e., the reaction functions shift up
only by one-half) but also higher demand for rivals whose marginal revenues shrink, inducing them to raise
freight rates as well (taking up the other half of the e¤ect).
By solving the above system and inserting (6) in (2)-(3) respectively, we derive pre-UDC freight rates
and market shares in equilibrium as follows:

fA = fB

f =w+c

DA = DB =

(6)

1
2

(7)

From (6), as expected, we notice that LSPs are able to fully pass-on (common) charges to customers.
More, for given identical service quality among LSPs in equilibrium, LSP’s market power over captive
customers (i.e., closer retailers on a time-distance basis) is enhanced by w. In terms of di¤erent urban
supply chains, this result can be interpreted as follows. The more supply chains are time-sensitive, the larger
is the market power that symmetrical LSPs might be able to exert on captive retailers.
The result for which equilibrium demands and prices are not a¤ected by symmetrical service quality is
rather standard in Hotelling static models. When quality is assumed identical among LSPs (and/or already
set over a minimum standard level), it does not have any impact on market shares and, in turn, on freight
rates. Should incumbent LSPs increase symmetrically their service quality (for instance, because they have
roughly the same size and/or are endowed with similar IT equipments), own demands are left unchanged
because the additional quality o¤ered simply cancels out. In other words, identical quality across …rms
entails that demand neutrality does channel to price neutrality.
At this point, in order for a fully-covered market equilibrium to exist, we have to make sure that all the
customers in the urban city centre would gain a (not strictly) positive utility being served by LSP A or B.
In other words, it must be checked whether the "indi¤erent" customer (located at x = 1=2) would gain a
utility greater than (or, at least, equal to) zero. This condition holds only if:
1 2 Second-order

conditions for local maxima are ful…lled as @ 2
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2
A (fA ; fB )=@fA

= @2

2
B (fB ; fA )=@fB

=

1
w

< 0:

VA (x = 1=2; f = w + c) = b q

w=2

(w + c)

0

that is, for a level of service quality (not strictly) greater than a (minimum) threshold denoted by q:

q

1
b

3
w+c
2

q

(8)

Valued at its su¢ cient level to ensure a fully-covered market (implying that even retailers located nearby
the inner city centre would patronize one of the two LSPs), the symmetrical service quality provided in
the pre-UDC scenario increases as retailers are more time-sensitive and/or with the extent of market-based
measures. Without loss of generality, hence we make the following assumption.
Assumption 1

In order to ensure a fully-covered market for urban freights (and thus deterring

own-account deliveries), LSP A and B supply the minimum level of service quality q.
In terms of accompanying measures able to pair the e¤ects of UDCs, Assumption 1 does emphasize how
congestion and/or pollution charges set by municipalities a¤ect the level of service quality o¤ered by LSPs.
In our setting, the condition under which the urban freights market is fully covered ensures that, in principle,
own-account deliveries are essentially ruled out by urban retailers. In particular, when local governments
set increasing charges, at the same time, they induce LSPs to provide a level of service quality accordingly.
As obverse facet, for a given level of charges, in case of more time-sensitive urban supply chains (higher
w), hence Assumption 1 shows that the market coverage is not ensured unless LSPs further increase own
(minimum) service quality.
By summing up the results in (6)-(8), …nally we state the:
Proposition 1 (Pre-UDC equilibrium). Before the introduction of UDCs, in a fully-covered market:
freight rates are neutral to symmetrical quality improvements;
market shares are neither a¤ ected by market-based measures nor by how retailers are time-sensitive;
the extent of market-based measures (i.e., congestion and/or pollution charges) is channelled to urban
retailers in terms of both higher service quality and freight rates.
A more general interpretation suggested by Proposition 1 is at point here. Before the introduction of
UDCs into urban supply chains, market shares are equally spread among symmetrical logistics providers,
regardless either the extent of market-based measures (i.e., pollution and/or congestion charges) or the
heterogeneity of retailers’ elasticity to delivery times. In particular, LSPs are always able to set higher
freight rates to more time-sensitive retailers. Intuitively, as in our setting retailers belonging to supply
chains with daily-and-…xed consignment requirements (e.g., fresh food, dairy, newspapers, etc.) are willing
to pay more for reliable and faster deliveries, LSPs would indeed exert their market power accordingly on
captive customers (that is, retailers that are closer in terms of time-distance). In conclusion, with the main
14

aim to help avoiding more polluting and less e¢ cient modes of consignment (e.g., own-account deliveries),
market-based measures set by municipalities are passed-through to customers in terms of higher freight rates
and have the major welfare-oriented e¤ect of increasing the (minimum) level of service quality provided.

3.2

Asymmetrical post-UDC scenario: equilibrium analysis

In this section our analysis departs from the previous (symmetrical) model of competition among LSPs to
allow for the introduction of public-private UDCs in the urban freights market. Although an UDC may be
potentially endowed with a monopolistic position in the last mile deliveries (i.e., whenever all the LSPs in
the market perform …nal consignments making use of a single UDC), here we neglect such a competitive
distortion by focusing on unilateral incentives for a given LSP (say, B) to apply for UDC-based services.
From a city logistics perspective, adding a downstream stage (reloading or transhipment node) to existing
supply chains might in‡uence retailers’ choice conducing to an imperfect competition among LSPs in two
ways. First, we refer to additional UDC service costs (including also handling, drafting, bargaining, etc.)
which might reduce the e¢ ciency of a certain supply chain by distorting (upward) freight rates. Second,
whenever retailers are supplied by UDC-based LSPs, they might su¤er from a disutility due to extra delivery
times measured from UDC consignment to …nal deliveries. In general, as LSPs taking parcels to an UDC
do not deliver goods to the …nal customers (i.e., retailers’shops), hence it is crucial to investigate what are
the conditions (in terms of service costs and quality) under which an LSP is willing to apply for UDC-based
services to cover own last mile deliveries.
In formal term, the utility function in (1) rewrites as follows:13
VA (x) = b q

w x

VB (x) = b (q +

q)

fA
w (1 +

Patronizing A
x)

fB

( 1; 0)
where

Patronizing B

(9)

Not patronizing any LSP at all

1=2 is a parameter that measures how time-consuming features related to UDCs (i.e., tran-

shipment and dwell times, ine¢ cient location) might reduce the utility of retailers which patronize LSP B.
This additional penalty for customers patronizing LSP B crucially depends on either the distance of UDCs
from highways or easy-to-access modal nodes or how well the UDC is integrated into the urban supply chain
(i.e., degree of diversion required from normal route). Since UDCs are typically located barely outside city
centres to minimize their distance to …nal customers, here we assume that the related route diversion would
imply an additional time-distance between UDCs and retailers (at most) equal to half the size of the city.14
This choice aims at avoiding unrealistic results for which UDC-based LSPs have zero market shares even by
o¤ering similar service quality and freight rates with respect to traditional LSPs. Put di¤erently, we are here
1 3 With
1 4 From

a slight abuse of notation, we label post-UDC …gures by using the superscript .
an environmental point of view, the optimal location of UDCs shows a trade-o¤. If UDCs are located several kilometres

from the consignment area, then the distance over which more eco-friendly UDC vehicles operate could be maximized. By
contrast, if UDCs are located very close to the served area, this choice would reduce the distance covered by eco-friendly
vehicles (Browne et al., 2005).
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considering that overall freight rates and quality are still more crucial than location and/or route diversion
in the market. All else equal, as

increases, the utility loss su¤ered by LSP B’s customers becomes more

severe.
As regards the level of service quality o¤ered after the introduction of UDCs, if it is kept identical among
providers (as assumed in the previous scenario), therefore UDC-based LSPs would probably set higher freight
rates (because of UDC service costs) and thus be less competitive than traditional rivals. In order to allow
for quality improvements applied by UDCs, hence we assume that they can provide better (or value-adding)
services (indicated by

q > 0) with respect to traditional LSPs (still o¤ering service quality q = q, as in the

pre-UDC scenario). In this way, we model a competitive environment in which LSPs would …nd UDC-based
services advantageous only if the "cost" of last mile deliveries (in terms of revenue loss) is greater than UDC
service costs. Clearly, this might hold unless UDCs are somehow able to provide value-adding services for
which retailers are more willing to pay.15
Given the above modi…ed utility functions, we derive the LSPs’demand functions as follows:

VA (x)

VB (x) () b q

w x

fA

b (q +

q)

w (1 +

x)

fB
(10)

) x

x(fA ; fB

1+
)=
2

+

fB

fA
b
2w

q

DA (fA ; fB )

where DA (fA ; fB ) represents A’s demand. Still by focusing our attention on fully-covered markets,
B’s demand is derived as a residual:

DB (fB ; fA )

1

DA (fA ; fB ) =

1
2

+

fA

fB + b
2w

q

(11)

Di¤erently from the pre-UDC period, new features may a¤ect LSPs’market shares. In particular, LSP B
(A)’s potential demand is positively (negatively) a¤ected by UDC’s value-adding services (captured by the
parameter

q). Regarding to the negative impact of

on the demand for UDC-based LSPs, by inspecting

(11) we can observe that even by setting identical levels of service quality and freight rates (i.e., fA = fB
and

q = 0), LSP B might be not able to gain the leadership in terms of markets shares because of the

above time-consuming aspects related to the UDC. As depicted in Figure 2, for symmetrical quality and
freight rates, if extra delivery times turn out to be very large ( ! 1=2), generalized costs associated to UDC
services will amount to fB + w (1
fA +wx

x + ) for retailers patronizing LSP B, while they will be still equal to

fA +wx by choosing LSP A. In this extreme case, LSP A would gain about the 75% of the market

(i.e., 3/4) while LSP B the residual 25% (i.e., 1/4). Threfore, UDC-based LSPs cannot dominate traditional
1 5 Here,

our modelisation is strongly inspired to value-adding schemes provided in the City Porto (Padua) or in the Binnen-

stadservice in Nijmegen (The Netherlands) where UDCs planned to o¤er many additional services to di¤erentiate themselves
from traditional LSPs and gather increasing market shares.
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rivals (in terms of market shares) unless by lowering own freight rates (fB < fA ) and/or providing quality
improvements ( q > 0).

Figure 2: Pre- and post-UDC market shares allocation (symmetrical case).

At this point, in order to derive the post-UDC equilibrium, the timing of the game is extended by
considering LSPs competing in two stages:
In the …rst stage, a public-private UDC establishes its service costs according to various level of public
subsidies granted by municipalities;
In the second stage, LSP A and B simultaneously set freight rates by taking into account their own
demand functions.
After the introduction of UDCs, hence our setting shifts from a symmetrical duopoly to an asymmetrical
competition among traditional and UDC-based LSPs in congested and narrow city centres. Therefore, in
contrast to charges levied to traditional LSPs who make use of heavy and polluting commercial vehicles (i.e.,
c > 0), we suppose that UDCs perform last mile deliveries by using not-polluting vehicles (e.g., electric,
hybrid vans). Basically, by applying for UDC-based services, LSP B might be able to avoid charges (i.e.,
c = 0).
In order to …nd the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of the game in post-UDC setting, we
proceed by backward induction, starting from the second stage where LSPs maximize the following pro…ts
with respect to own freight rates:
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A

(fA ; fB )

=

Z

DA (fA ;fB )

(fA

c) dx

0

B

(fB ; fA )

=

Z

(12)
1

(fB

s) dx

DA (fA ;fB )

where s > 0 represents UDC service costs. By substituting (10)-(11) in (12), the …rst order conditions
yield the following best-response functions:16

fA (fB )

=

c + (1 + ) w

b

q + fB

2
(13)

fB (fA )

=

s + (1

)w + b
2

q + fA

Still in the post-UDC market, freight rates are strategic complements. Whereas increasing UDC service
costs make LSP B’s response shift up inducing an increase in own freight rates (i.e., @fB (fA )=@s = 1=2 > 0),
instead UDC quality improvements crucially move LSP A’s reaction downward (i.e., @fA (fB )=@ q =
b=2 < 0). In fact, whenever retailers bene…t from value-adding services by patronizing LSP B, in the
second stage, the lowest-quality LSP A would reduce its own freight rates to attract demand. Furthermore,
increasing values of

contribute to both the reaction functions as LSP B (A)’s reaction would shift down

(up).
By solving the above system, we obtain the second stage equilibrium freight rates as functions of both
UDC service costs and quality o¤ered:

fA (s)

=

(3 + ) w + 2c + s
3

b

q
(14)

fB (s)

=

(3

) w + c + 2s + b
3

q

From (14), both LSPs’ equilibrium freight rates increase with charges and UDC service costs (as they
represent costs to be passed-on to customers). However, the extent of this e¤ect is di¤erent among LSPs.
While increasing charges a¤ect A’s freight rates more e¤ectively than B’s ones (i.e., @fA (s)=@c = 2=3 >
1=3 = @fB (s)=@c), the opposite result occurs dealing with UDC service costs (i.e., @fB (s)=@s = 2=3 >
1=3 = @fA (s)=@s). Here it is important to notice that two-thirds of UDC-based service quality are taken
up in terms of increased B’s freight rates, while one-third of charges (levied to traditional LSPs only) still
impacts on UDC-based LSPs. This means that, although municipalities set market-based measures to deter
1 6 Second

order conditions hold as @ 2

A

2 = @2
=@fA

B

2 =
=@fB
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1
w

< 0:

traditional (and less eco-friendly) deliveries, in the presence of LSPs’competition in strategic complements,
the extent of these charges does contribute to make UDC-based LSPs less competitive (by raising their
freight rates).
Going backward we …nd the sub-game perfect equilibrium of the game by considering, in the …rst stage,
the optimal choice of service costs level made by a public-private UDC. In this case, we consider a distribution
facility which maximizes a weighted combination of pro…ts and markets shares to model two key features of
several welfare-oriented entities (such as schools, transport companies, hospitals, etc.).17 First, UDCs may
need to make pro…ts in competitive settings with decreasing public resources to spend, that is, facing notthat-soft budget constraints. Second, increasing market shares might be important to public-private UDCs
because local governments mainly aim at spreading out more eco-friendly ways to deliver goods in city centres.
In other words, whenever UDCs contribute (at some extent) to maximize their vertical-related LSPs’market
shares, they also help inner cities to avoid more polluting commercial vehicles. As a consequence, the more
UDCs are welfare-oriented (high public subsidies), the more they might be willing to enhance own service
quality by (partially) disregarding the related e¤ects on costs.
Formally, we consider an UDC that maximizes the following objective function:

W (s) =

Z

1

(s +

k

q) dx

(15)

DA (fA ;fB )

where

> 0 is a parameter that measures the direct public subsidies granted to UDC operations. As

increases, UDCs would take into account general public concerns (such as air quality and tra¢ c congestion)
and are willing to set lower service costs to induce more retailers to patronize LSP B.18 Marginal costs of
quality investments are captured by the parameter 0 < k < b. Two remarks are in order at this point.
First, for a given level of quality improvements o¤ered, UDC service costs must be su¢ ciently low to make
LSP B set, in turn, lower freight rates and attract a larger demand. Second, as a welfare-oriented UDC
is keen to lower its service costs, this fact potentially leaves smaller market shares (or residual demand)
to traditional LSPs. To conclude the analysis of the …rst-stage equilibrium, we solve the UDC’s objective
function maximization problem with respect to s (the related …rst order condition implies @W (s)=@s = 0):19

s( ) =

(3

)w + c

+

q (b + k)

(16)

2

The interpretation of (16) reveals that, without a direct public intervention (that is, when

= 0), the

only way for UDCs to lower own service costs is to reduce quality investments as well. Furthermore, in the
presence of time-sensitive retailers (high w), the level of UDC service costs increases as well.
Finally, by inserting (16) in (10)-(14), we derive post-UDC freight rates and market shares (demands),
respectively. The following formulations:
1 7 See

Herr et al. (2011) for a similar argument.
to be economically viable an UDC project must entail enough revenue to cover (often very high) …xed costs.

1 8 Obviously,

For sake of convenience, however, here we rule out break-even issues (by setting null or already covered overheads).
1
1 9 Second-order conditions are ful…lled as @ 2 W (s)=@s2 =
< 0.
3w
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3
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(20)

allow us to state the:
Proposition 2 (Post-UDC equilibrium freight rates). After the introduction of UDCs, traditional (UDCbased) LSP’s freight rates:
increase with either market-based measures or in presence of more time-sensitive retailers;
decrease with public subsidies;
decrease (increase) with UDC quality improvements; and
increase (decrease) with extra delivery times.
As a result, in order to let UDC-based LSPs be more competitive, market-based measures and public
subsidies must be complements.

As far as freight rates are concerned, Proposition 2 …rst shows that, similarly to the pre-UDC scenario,
both retailers’ elasticity to delivery times (captured by w) and market-based measures (measured by c)
contribute to increase overall freight rates. In other words, after the introduction of UDCs, the above
features still allow LSPs to exploit their market power over respective customers. However, in contrast to
what concluded in Proposition 1, other aspects associated to UDCs might a¤ect equilibrium freight rates.
Firstly, public subsidies will have a downward impact on both LSPs’ freight rates, albeit with di¤erent
magnitudes. Since freight rates are strategic complements, increasing public subsidies lower B’s freight rates
and channel this e¤ect (at a smaller extent) to A’s ones.20 For the purpose of our research, by Proposition
2 we can conclude that, should UDC-based LSPs set the lowest freight rates, then higher congestion and/or
pollution charges have to be paired with large public subsidies as well. Secondly, the ability of UDCs to
increase revenues by improving their service quality (e.g., value-adding services which would be channelled
to LSP B’s freight rates) might be crucially o¤set by extra delivery times generated by transhipment and
route diversion. The reason behind this result is brie‡y explained as follows. Whereas quality improvements
2 0 Formally,

it is straightforward to check that j@fB ( ;

q)=@ j = 1=3 > 1=6 = j@fA ( ;

20

q)=@ j.

o¤ered by UDCs have a positive impact on customers’ willingness to pay, instead extra delivery times act
in the opposite way. Put di¤erently, the highest-quality LSP B has the incentive to raise own freight rates
accordingly but, at the same time, it must reduce them in order to cope with a potentially decreasing demand
due to extra delivery times.
Turning to equilibrium markets shares occuring after the implementation of UDCs, their determinants
are shown in the following:
Proposition 3 (Post-UDC equilibrium market shares). After the introduction of UDCs, traditional (UDCbased) LSP’s market shares:
increase (decrease) in presence of more time-sensitive retailers and extra delivery times;
decrease (increase) with market-based measures, public subsidies, and UDC quality improvements.
In order to make UDC-based LSPs gain the largest market shares, market-based measures and public
subsidies must be substitutes.

Di¤erently from what concluded in the previous section, Proposition 3 shows that, in the post-UDC
scenario, equilibrium market shares are strongly a¤ected by features related to public policies. From UDCbased LSPs’ point of view, in particular we suggest that their market shares might be enhanced by three
elements, i.e., UDC quality improvements, market-based measures, and public subsidies.
In the …rst case, ceteris paribus, quality improvements make retailers prefer to patronize LSPs which
apply for UDC-based services. This implies that, by providing value-adding services, vertically-related LSPs
might be able to cope with additional UDC service costs (double marginalization) and extra delivery times
(captured by

). However, for given value-adding services, LSP A’s captive customers may not switch to

another logistics provider unless UDC is able to dramatically reduce extra delivery times (for instance, by
limiting the diversion from normal routes and/or arranging UDC not far from highways or modal nodes).
As regards the interplay between market-based measures and public subsidies, Proposition 3 does stress
their substitutability in order to let LSP B gain the leadership in terms of market shares. In particular, as
done by market-based measures, also increasing public subsidies raise LSP B’s market shares and reduce
LSP A’s ones.21 To conclude, in order to spread out less polluting deliveries in urban contexts (via larger
UDC-based LSPs’demand), more strict market-based measures (e.g., higher charges) would call for reducing
public subsidies. At this point, to derive the condition for a fully-covered market to be ful…lled, we must
have that:22
VA (x = DA ( ; q); q = q)

0 =) b q

w DA ( ; q)

fA ( ; q)

0

By substituting (8), (17) and (19) in the above inequality, in the post-UDC scenario all the retailers
decide to patronize at least one of the two LSPs only if:
2 1 By

1
1
looking at (19)-(20), we can easily check that @DB ( ; q)=@ = 12w
> 0 and @DA ( ; q)=@ = 12w
> 0.
in this scenario, the level of service quality o¤ered by not UDC-based LSP is assumed to be equal to the pre-UDC

2 2 Also

(minimum) level (i.e., q = q).

21

(3 + ) w

c

q (b

k)

(21)

that is, for a su¢ ciently high level of public subsidies.
An important result coming from (21) is at point. For whatever level of public subsidies beyond

, two

outcomes occur, that is, (i) the post-UDC market will be fully covered and, at the same time, (ii) UDC-based
LSPs would gain the leadership in terms of market shares. The intuition behind this conclusion is explained
as follows. By setting public subsidies at their (at least) minimum level to ensure a full post-UDC market
coverage (i.e.,

), we have again avoided some retailers not choosing any LSP and thus we have ruled

out the preference for own-account deliveries. In turn, no empty sets of LSPs’customers in the post-UDC
scenario also imply that freight rates (dragged downward by public subsidies equal to

) are enough low

to attract customers located in the middle of the city centre (that is, at x = 1=2). As a result, any (even
slight) increase in terms of public subsidies would contribute to larger LSP B’s market shares.23

4

UDC quality investments and public subsidies: a trade-o¤

In this last section we restrict our attention on the interplay between public subsidies and UDC quality improvements. More precisely, the role of value-adding services (i.e., pre-retail, stocking, tracing and tracking,
return logistics, etc.) that could be provided by UDCs is analyzed to understand at what extent this feature
(combined to public subsidies) might in‡uence the competition among LSPs in terms of freight rates. Since
in our modelisation any quality improvements boost the willingness to pay of customers, indeed they are
likely to enhance market power (and thus freight rates). As a consequence, in general, quality improvements
o¤ered by UDCs would entail that LSP B’s freight rates will be greater than LSP A’s ones. Anyway, recalling
what concluded in the previous section, in a post-UDC fully-covered market, higher freight rates charged
by UDC-based LSPs do not impede to gain larger market shares. In particular, whenever public subsidies
are set above their minimum level to ensure the market coverage (i.e.,

must be slightly greater than

),

UDC-based LSPs are able to gather the largest demand. From a normative perspective, this would entail
the following consequence. In principle, the potential welfare-enhancing e¤ect of UDC quality improvements
might be unfortunately o¤set by higher (average) freight rates. In fact, whereas some retailers will enjoy
higher quality (via value-adding services) at higher freight rates by patronizing UDC-based LSPs, instead
those still choosing traditional (not UDC-based) LSPs would pay less for having a lower quality. Although
2 3 Formally,

by comparing (20) to (19), we can derive the conditions for which UDC-based LSPs are able to grab more market

shares (larger demand) with respect to traditional rivals in the post-UDC scenario. This holds when (arguments omitted):
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this result is not necessarily detrimental, it may be worthing to identify the extent at which public subsidies
are required to mitigate this alleged price-increasing e¤ect of UDC quality investments. As obverse facet, in
case of local governments aiming at gradually reducing the dependence of UDCs from subsidies (for budget
reasons and/or to avoid crowding-out e¤ects in the long run), thus we would like to investigate whether relatively high UDC quality improvements and decreasing public subsidies can be compatible with a post-UDC
scenario in which, on average, retailers will enjoy a higher service quality at lower freight rates.
Before tackling this issue by considering post-UDC average freight rates, we must …rst derive the level of
public subsidies for which LSP B’s freight rates are likely to be lower than LSP A’s ones. By comparing (17)
and (18), we observe that, after the introduction of UDCs, LSP B may be (not strictly) more competitive
than A when (arguments omitted):
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At this point, we may wonder whether any positive level of quality investments would increase UDC-based
LSPs’freight rates, thus calling for larger public subsidies. Intuitively, since in our modelisation value-adding
services increase the willingness to pay of UDC-based LSPs’customers, then quality features might enhance
market power (and thus freight rates). As a consequence, in general, quality improvements would entail that
LSP B’s freight rates are expected to exceed LSP A’s ones.
In this sense, by looking at (21) and (22), we …nd that the threshold

f

is (not strictly) greater than

when:

(3

5 )w

c+

q (5b + k)

(3 + ) w

c

q (b

that is, only for a relatively high level of value-adding services, i.e.,

k)
q

w=b. In other words,

whenever UDCs o¤er su¢ ciently high quality improvements (with respect to the retailers’ elasticity to
delivery times, measured by w), for

f

, UDC-based LSPs are leaders in terms of market shares but

their customers will likely be destined to pay more with respect to traditional LSPs’ones. In this case UDC
quality improvements are completely channelled to LSP B’s freight rates (i.e., fB
any level of public subsidies larger than

f

fA ). By contrast,

would let UDC-based LSPs gain the largest market shares at

the lowest freight rates (i.e., fB < fA ). In other words, in a fully-covered post-UDC market, the relative
extent of UDC quality improvements does combine with public subsidies to determine whether UDC-based
LSPs would be able to strive own market power over customers. The stronger the public e¤ort in terms
of subsidies, the higher is the ability of UDC-based LSPs to pro…tably operate in the market (i.e., larger
revenues coming from value-adding services). In turn, this would imply that very high subsidies would also
positively a¤ect the potential demand for UDC services by LSPs.
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At this point, in order to compare pre- and post-UDC average freight rates, we …rst de…ne the latter as:
fA + fB
2

f

(23)

then, by making use of (6) and (23), we have that:24
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is e¤ective in a fully-covered post-UDC market (i.e.,

), we compare (21) and (24). In particular, since:
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always holds for relatively high quality investments, we can conclude that both the thresholds
are greater than

for

q

w=b. Turning to the comparison between

f

and

f

f

and

f

, by using (22) and (24),

we also have that:
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w=b. This means that, in the considered region of

as well. Summing up, for

order) is the following:
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q
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f

is (not strictly) greater than

w=b, the ranking of thresholds related to public subsidies (in descending
(

).

In summary, we can state the following:
Proposition 4 (Trade-o¤ between public subsidies and UDC quality investments). In a fully-covered postUDC market:
for relatively high UDC quality investments (with respect to retailers’ elasticity to delivery times),
decreasing public subsidies might be compatible with welfare-enhancing average freight rates in the
market;
the above required level of quality investments (i.e., value-adding services) is positively a¤ ected by both
the type of retailers’ supply chain (more or less time-sensitive) and the extent of extra delivery times
associated with UDCs’ operations.
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Figure 3: Trade-o¤ between public subsidies and UDC quality investments.

As also described in Figure 3, Proposition 4 clari…es two main results related to the competitive interplay
between UDC quality investments and public subsidies in the post-UDC scenario.
Firstly, in presence of su¢ ciently high UDC quality improvements (proportional to how retailers’supply
chains are time-sensitive), we can enlist three relevant levels of public subsidies a¤ecting LSPs’competition
in freight rates.
For relatively very high subsidies (i.e.,

>

f

f

), as expected, UDC-based LSPs can gain the

largest available portion of market shares at the lowest freight rates. In practice, they are able to gain an
almost monopolistic position (i.e., DB tends to the total demand) by lowering dramatically own freght rates
(i.e., fB < fA ). In a sense, they cannot exert a signi…cant market power over captive customers and, as
a result, average freight rates will shrink. From a consumer welfare perspective, this is probably the best
outcome: higher service quality for almost the entire population of customers (retailers) in the market paired
with decreasing equilibrium freight rates. However, this might also imply very high costs in terms of public
budgeting. In this case, local governments granting subsidies to sustain UDCs might not indeed commit to
gradually reduce crowding-out e¤ects (i.e., private investments are not incentivized) and/or to diminish the
dependence of UDCs upon public resources (with negative consequences on their social acceptance).
By contrast, for relatively very low subsidies (i.e.,

f

f

>

), UDC-based LSPs are still able

to dominate the market even though at a smaller extent (i.e., DB would be slightly larger that DA ). In
addition, they will set higher freight rates with respect to traditional LSPs (that is, by imposing a larger
market power), inducing post-UDC average freight rates to rise up (i.e., fB > fA and f > f ). In a sense,
2 4 In

our model, by considering not demand-weighted average freight rates, we would focus on the extent of post-UDC

competition in freight rates.
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this situation might allow local governments to reduce the alleged dependence of UDCs upon public subsidies,
but at a very high cost in terms of consumer welfare. In fact, less urban retailers would bene…t from higher
UDC-based service quality and also, on average, consumers will be worse o¤ (as post-UDC freight rates are
higher).
However, as shown in Figure 3, there exists an intermediate region of public subsidies for which both
private and public objectives might be satis…ed. In particular, for a level of subsidies between

f

and

f

, the

following scenario would occur: (i) UDC-based LSPs can grab a signi…cant portion of the market (i.e., DB
would be e¤ectively larger that DA ) and also exert some market power over customers (i.e., fB > fA ); (ii)
on average, consumers are better o¤ as post-UDC equilibrium freight rates are lower than pre-UDC ones (i.e.,
f < f ); and (iii) local governments may be able to increase the social acceptance of UDCs as subsidies are
not that high and also a rather large set of retailers can bene…t from a higher service quality (by patronizing
UDC-based LSPs). The intuition behind this last result can be brie‡y explained as follows. By recalling
Proposition 2, whenever UDC quality investments are relatively high (increasing

q), LSP B’s freight rates

could expand while LSP A’s ones shrink, making the former exert market power (at some extent) over own
captive customers. However, as the impact of public subsidies on B’s freight rates is more e¤ective than A’s
ones, thus the minimum required level of

in order to reduce average freight rates turns out to be lower. As

a result, despite UDC-based LSPs are less competitive than traditional rivals, overall customers are better
o¤ (i.e., a relatively larger number of retailers would bene…t from higher quality at lower freight rates).
Secondly, the impact of the heterogeneity of urban supply chains (i.e., how retailers are time-sensitive in
terms of delivery times) may be crucial in order to determine the extent of welfare-enhancing UDC quality
investments. In fact,

q has to be higher than an increasing function of w and , respectively. All else being

equal, hence the second result in Proposition 4 does stress out the fact that more time-sensitive retailers
- along the discussion we have referred to supply chains in which daily-and-…xed consignments would be
required, as in the case of perishable goods like fresh food, newspapers, ‡owers, milk and dairy, etc. - would
need higher UDC quality investments accordingly to boost vertically-related LSPs’ demand (and market
shares). In an analogous way, structural conditions a¤ecting the extent of extra delivery times (e.g., UDC
location and route diversion) are likely to in‡uence (upward) the required level of UDC quality investments.

5

Concluding remarks and policy implications

In this paper we use a spatial competition framework to study the e¤ects of the introduction of UDCs on
the competition among third-party logistics service providers. Our analysis has been conducted under two
di¤erent scenarios. In the …rst (pre-UDC) scenario, as widely observed in many crowded and polluted cities
around Europe, traditional LSPs perform parcels consignments to urban retailers into inner city centres
(the so-called last mile) by competing in service quality and freight rates but also facing market-based
measures (i.e., congestion and/or pollution charges) set by municipalities to help reducing air pollution
and tra¢ c congestion (e.g., in London, Stockholm, Milan, Paris, etc.). In the second (post-UDC) scenario,
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public-private UDCs are introduced into already established urban supply chains. In fact, by applying for
UDC-based delivery services, vertically-related LSPs admit costs and bene…ts. On the one hand, extra
delivery times (due to the fact that, for instance, UDCs may not be well-located outside urban areas and/or
transhipments operations cause dwell times) and UDC service costs combine together to cause more expensive
supply chains. On the other hand, however, free-of-charge deliveries (very often, UDCs make use of ecofriendly electric commercial vehicles) and publicly subsidized UDC service costs may be able to reduce
freight rates. In addition, as exhibited in recent successful experiences of UDCs in the EU - notably, we
refer to either the City Porto in Padua (Italy) or the Binnenstadservice in Nijmegen (the Netherlands) UDCs might invest in service quality improvements (in the form of value-adding services such as pre-retail,
stocking, tracing and tracking, return logistics, etc.) to reach a two-fold goal, that is, to increase their
potential demand (coming from incumbent LSPs) and thus to be …nancially viable without relying upon
subsidies in the long run.
By taking into consideration urban retailers that belong to variable time-sensitive supply chains, in this
work we investigate the theoretical conditions under which LSPs might pro…tably apply for UDCs (i.e., to
gather larger market shares) in a market in which service quality and freight rates are the main determinants
of customers’choice. In this way, we obtain two main results.
First, by assuming that in the fully-covered pre-UDC setting service quality is symmetrical among LSPs
(for instance, in case of incumbent integrators such as UPS, TNT or DHL having similar technology and/or
company size), we …rst show that either the extent at which retailers are time-sensitive or the level of
market-based measures set by municipalities might have the major e¤ect to make traditional LSPs increase
the (minimum) service quality o¤ered. As a result, while market shares are not a¤ected by service quality
in the symmetrical pre-UDC scenario, instead retailers’ preferences for delivery times and market-based
measures are passed-on to related customers. In particular, in the pre-UDC scenario, these features may
allow LSPs to exert market power over exclusive urban retailers accordingly. For instance, in the presence
of retailers belonging to more time-sensitive supply chains (e.g., bread and pastry, newspapers, …sh cool,
etc.), LSPs might charge higher freight rates as their time-distance to captive retailers is smaller. Therefore,
before the introduction of UDCs in the competition among LSPs, we can conclude that, for whatever type of
retailers’supply chain (characterized by daily-and-…xed or weekly-and-‡exible consignments), market-based
measures might e¤ectively contribute to increase service quality to avoid more polluting forms of deliveries,
i.e., own-account deliveries. Hence, this normative tool seems to be particularly suitable (and thus to be
encouraged) in several historical cities (especially in Italy) where more polluting and less e¢ cient deliveries
are largely spread out.
Second, after the introduction of public-private UDCs in urban supply chains, however, market-based
measures might have a more subtle e¤ect on the price-quality competition among logistics providers. On the
one hand, they increase freight rates associated to traditional third-party consignments and thus give urban
retailers the incentive to patronize UDC-based logistics service providers. In a sense, as widely recognized,
public intervention by municipalities in the form of public subsidies paired with su¢ ciently restrictive market27

based measures might be decisive to stimulate eco-friendly urban freights. On the other hand, however, since
logistics service providers compete in strategic complements (freight rates), those measures may contribute to
make UDC-based logistics companies more expensive as well. Furthermore, if we take into account additional
"costs" associated to UDCs, such as the double marginalization problem (i.e., downstream freight rates have
to incorporate UDC service costs) and extra delivery times (e.g., UDCs are often not well-located outside
urban areas), market-based measures imply two main controversial consequences.
In the …rst case, as congestion and/or pollution charges increase, the potential demand for UDC-based
services might e¤ectively be raised even in the presence of lower public subsidies. In particular, as charges
negatively a¤ect the demand of traditional LSPs, thus market-based measures and public subsidies might
be considered as complements in order to boost the potential demand for UDC-based LSPs’deliveries. In
this case, we can refer to the V.E.L.O.C.E. distribution centre established in Vicenza (Italy) in 2005 where
several municipal ordinances were applied (from April 2005 to December 2006), progressively reducing the
tra¢ c access to the local LTZ. Pairing these measures with a local UDC, the municipality was allowed to
sustain the UDC’s demand and thus facilitating its …nancial stand-alone viability.
In the second case, however, as market-based measures contribute to overall higher freight rates, they
must be considered as substitutes to public subsidies in order to enhance the consumer welfare in terms
of average post-UDC freight rates. At this point, by assuming that public-private UDCs may be able to
make investments to improve own service quality (i.e., value-adding services), we obtained the last important
result of our model. Whenever quality investments are enough large to cope with either more time-sensitive
retailers’ supply chains or extra delivery times induced by consolidation and/or route diversion, we show
that a larger part of urban retailers would bene…t from higher quality services (through UDCs) at lower
average freight rates. From a public welfare point of view, hence quality improvements may substitute
for public subsidies in order to reduce overall freight rates. In a sense, whenever UDCs invest in quality
improvements, decreasing public subsidies can be sustainable in the long run and also UDCs might be viable
as well. This last result seems to con…rm recent experiences of successful UDCs where several value-adding
services are provided and public subsidies have been gradually reduced, such as the CityPorto in Padua
(Italy) or the Binnenstadservice in Nijmegen (the Netherlands). In particular, after 2009 (that is, the agreed
expiration year for subsidies), in the Cityporto in Padua tailored and speci…c know-how was developed to
answer logistics needs by proposing a wide variety of value-adding services including storage, management
services, and assistance to national/international transports, focusing on rail-road intermodality.
Since the obtained results are encouraging, the future next step of the research will aim to empirically
validate the model, by collecting data from at least two case studies of successful UDC implementation and
building up structured interviews with LSPs, retailers, municipal delegates and other stakeholders involved
in the projects. Thus, we will able to describe in details which are the business models applied the UDCs
and their evolution in the last years of activity, as a reaction to public subsidies progressively decrease over
the time.
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